Autonomy, Moral Status, and Biomedical Ethics

Abstract

Autonomy is a widely applied, yet heavily debated concept. This paper will provide background on the four main conceptions of autonomy: coherentistism, reasons-responsiveness, responsiveness-to-reasoning, and incoherentism. These theories characterize an autonomous agent as one with a specific quality or mindset, such as one who endorses one’s actions, has the capacity to reason, or has independence from external influences. This paper argues that autonomy is best defined by a set of criteria, rather than by a single requirement. For an agent to be autonomous, they must have self-respect, awareness of all their options, and freedom from being explicitly coerced into action. In order to further address the complexity of autonomy and the different factors that can affect it, autonomy must be considered a trait that comes in degrees, rather than an all-or-nothing condition. 

As a result of this new definition, the relationship between autonomy and moral status must be reevaluated. It is widely believed that if an agent is autonomous, they should have moral status: the right to be treated as an individual rather than as a tool for another purpose. However, in light of this new definition of autonomy, their relationship becomes controversial. If only those with autonomy have moral status, then no species other than human beings would have it. Therefore, moral status must be restructured to be separate from autonomy. By examining the hypothetical practice of harvesting organs from ‘bodyoids’, genetically engineered, non-sentient human beings, we review the questions that must be answered before moral status can be defined, thereby laying the foundation to preserve the rights of living things.