Moral Hazard in Prominent Members of Society
Exploring Financial Implications
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.58445/rars.2407Keywords:
society, moral hazardAbstract
In recent discussions regarding the lousy aspect of luck (in which people assume that the chances of something bad happening are too low), the idea of moral hazard relating to U.S. policymakers has been introduced. Consumers blindly trust the people in charge, and rarely recognize when they are being taken advantage of. Rutger Claassen of Utrecht University states, “citizens may have been unable…to make well-informed decisions about the level of risk they are willing to accept, and financial providers may have exploited this lack of knowledge” (2015). Furthermore, Lina He et al. state “Doctor moral hazard has a significant effect on the doctor-patient relationship, increases the cost of healthcare, and introduces medical risks. It is a global concern” (2020). With these two statements in mind, one is prompted to ask how moral hazard influences the financial, health-related, and political policies made by policymakers in the U.S., which affect the everyday lives of millions of people. If people are being exploited to benefit their providers, the policies must be recognized and alternative systems created.
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